# DEFINITENESS, PRESUPPOSITION, AND ANAPHORICITY IN THERESENTENCES AND ADJECTIVAL PREDICATE CONSTRUCTIONS

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In the paper "Definiteness in there-sentences", Language 2, June 1978, E. Rando and D. J. Napoli suggested, with strong-empirical support, that such terms most typically used to describe restrictions on there-sentences, as definiteness and indefiniteness be replaced by anaphoricity and non-anaphoricity.

To substantiate this suggestion, they tried to generalize the term 'non-anaphoric' as "the most accurate and syntactically testable" (309). In the concluding part of the paper they "would like to suggest that this type of analysis can be fruitfully applied to many other syntactic phenomena" (311).

In the present paper, my intention is to analyse the reliability of the above intuitions on the part of the authors when the chosen grammatical corpus is the adjectival predicate constructions (Rosenbaum 1967:100-108).

To start with, let us recall that, up to now, the syntactic classification of the corpus under discussion has been based on either syntactic (e.g. Rosenbaum 1967:100-108) or semantic (e.g. P. Kiparsky and C. Kiparsky 1971, or Jackendoff 1972) criteria. Putting aside the syntactic criteria for obvious reasons' the competing semantic criteria in our case will be anaphoricity/non-anaphoricity, on the one hand, and factivity/non-factivity as correlated with

presupposition placement, on the other.

According to Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971), syntactic differences among the variants of complementation are correlated with semantic differences. Most of the syntactic reality in a given sentential sequence can be explained and determined by such contrastive notions of semantic value as factive/non-

factive. In this way, semantic differences between factive and non-factive complement paradigms can be related to their syntactic differences.

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The division into factive/non-factive is based on the deep-structure level of linguistic representation. As far as the grammatical corups chosen for the present analysis is concerned, closest to the factive deeps tructure are constructions of the type:

- $\begin{array}{c} \text{(1) a. John is happy about sth} \\ \text{John lives in London} \end{array} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{John is happy (about the fact)} \\ \text{that he lives in London} \end{array}$ 
  - b. I am aware of sth
    John lives in London

    John lives in London
- and, closest to the non-factive deep structure, might be, e.g.:
  - $\begin{array}{ccc} \text{(2) a. Sth is likely} \\ & \text{Tom lives in London} \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \text{It is likely that Tom lives} \\ \text{in London} \end{array}$ 
    - b. Tom is eager for sth
      Tom to live in London

      Tom is eager for Tom to live
      in London 
      Tom is eager to live in London

It should be stressed, though, that the above mentioned controlling function of factivity/non-factivity is strictly correlated with presupposition placement. In sentences (1), with factive complement, the speaker first presupposes that the embedded clause expresses a true proposition, and then makes some other assertion (tells something else) about it — according to the interpretation: "I presuppose that John lives in London and assert that he is happy about it". As the presupposition is the first-step judgement on the truth value of a given proposition on the part of the speaker, the only conclusion that may be drawn is that factivity depends on presupposition and not on assertion. In contrast to the factive variant, there is no presupposition on the part of the speaker in non-factive clauses (2) in which the speaker first asserts in the main clause that the proposition Tom lives in London is likely. In this way, the 'likeliness' of the proposition blocks any preceding presupposition placement; that is why the non-factive clauses are semantically simpler.

In contrast to the above interpretation, Jackendoff's approach (1972) to the problem shows a variety of distinctions. First, presupposition placement is determined directly on the surface, and not in the deep structure, though it remains a purely semantic notion and retains all its semanto-syntactic relations and controlling potentialities which are characteristic of the system of 'Fact' Second, according to Jackendoff (1972:241), "a well-formed semantic interpretation of a sentence must be divided into Focus and Presupposition. "If so,

also non-factive variants (2), contrary to the theory of 'Fact', must have their presuppositions; hence the division into Focal and Inherent Presupposition in Jackendoff's system - the former corresponding with the non-factive, 'nonpresuppositional' variant of the 'Fact' theory, and the latter, with its factive counterpart.

According to its term, the focal presupposition and its placement are strictly related with the notion of focus and its assignment. "We use the term focus of a sentence to denote the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker not to be shared by him and the hearer, and presupposition of a sentence to denote the information that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer" (Jackendoff 1972:230). In this sense, our discourse is natural if successive sentences share presuppositions, that is, if the two speakers agree on what information they have in common. The 'newness' of the information denoted by the focus is formally explicated phonologically by a special stress placement, and semantically, by the observation of a special Rule of Focus Assignment (Jackendoff 1972:240): "the semantic material associated with surface structure nodes dominated by F is the Focus of the sentence. To derive the presupposition (focal), substitute appropriate semantic variables for the focussed material".

From what the rule says, then, the appropriate semantic variables are to be substituted for the Focus - to form a focal presupposition, The variable must be chosen in such a way that "it defines a coherent class of possible contrasts with the focus, pieces of information that could equally well have taken the place of the focus in a sentence, within bounds limited by the language, the discourse, and the external situation" (Jackendoff 1972:243). The condition on the choice of a given variable, then, is that the variable have the same semantic form as the focus. To show how it works, let us analyse our non-factive, 'nonpresuppositional' examples (2 a, b), in the following discourse:


- (3) a. A: Where does Tom live now?
  - B: It is likely that he lives in London
  - A: Well, it is possible that he does but I'm not quite certain.
  - b. A: Say, Tom is eager to live in London
    - B: Oh, no! He is unwilling to live there.

In the above examples, the marker F dominates both likely and possible, on the one hand, and eager and unwilling, on the other. These are contrastive variables of the same semantic form. What is shared by the speaker and hearer in these sentences then, and what is presupposed as a result, is 'the sameness' of the semantic form. The information which is not shared by the speaker and the hearer, the 'newness', is represented by the respective, contrastive variables which are correlated with and dominated by the focal part of the utterance. It is characteristic of this type that both — presupposition placement ('the sameness' of the semantic form) and contrastive variables assignment, take place within the main clause.

When under a closer examination, the above semantic relations characteristic of the type under discussion show a specific resemblance to the paradigmatic relations appearing on the *syntactic* level of linguistic description; at least when they refer to the principle of *substitution*:

(4) a. Syntactic form ('the sameness of'):

b. Semantic form ('the sameness of'):



semantic (contrastive) variables

If it is so, presuppositional placement in this type is based on subjective, substitutional concept of the objective identity of the semnatic form according to the 'vertical' dimension which is characteristic of the paradigmatic relations in syntax:

(5) a. Concept: Pressupposition

$$\left. egin{array}{l} ext{the sameness} \\ ext{of semantic} \\ ext{form} \end{array} 
ight\} \left[ + ext{objective} 
ight]$$

b. Semantic variables:

'newness'

+subjective on the part of the speaker

Focal substitution — "within bounds limited by the language, the discourse, and the external situation".

To compare now, the inherent presupposition belongs to quite a different 'dimension' in this sense. First, it is not based on the concept but on observation and reflection on the part of the speaker and must be supplemented by something new, which is not shared by both the speaker and the hearer. The presupposition being placed on the embedded clause as a rule, the reference between the presupposition and the new information (assertion) on the part of the speaker resembles, contrary to the previous type, rather 'syntagmatic', 'horizontal' relations:

(6) Tom is happy (ab. the fact) that he lives in London

To summarize, here is the formalization of the two presuppositions:

(7) a. Focal Presupposition

+SUBSTITUTION

('paradigmatic')
+CONCEPT

+OBJECTIVE
(semantic form)
-'NEWNESS' →
+'NEWNESS'
(semantic va-

riables)


b. Inherent VPresupposition

+OBSERVATION and
REFLECTION
+LINEAR
('syntagmatic')
+OBJECTIVE
-'NEWNESS'

Owing to the fact that these two presuppositions belong to two different 'dimensions' of linguistic realization, the sentences with inherent presupposition (6) are, in fact, 'two-presuppositional' because the inherent presupposition, as resulting from OBSERVATION, triggers the focal presupposition automatically. It depends only on the kind of discourse whether the focal presupposition involves semantic variables, or not:

- (8) a. A: Tom is happy that he lives in London B: Yes, he really is (happy)
  - b. A: Tom is happy that he lives in LondonB: But he is unhappy that he lives there

The referential relation between the two presuppositions may be generalized, as follows:



Inversely, the type with focal presupposition, as based on CONCEPT, is a 'one-presuppositional' type:

From what has been presented up to now, it is easy to notice the importance of temporal reference in the classification of the structures under discussion. Thus in the type (9), the placement of inherent presupposition precedes the placement of focal presupposition. Using other words, we might say that the

placement of inherent presupposition stimulates the placement of focal presupposition which, in turn, stimulates a subjective and optional placement of the semantic variables. Contrary to this type, in type (10), the placement of focal presupposition is a primary conceptual stimulus for the involvement of above mentioned semantic variables on the part of the speaker/hearer.

The second vital observation is the possibility of correlation between factual orientation and definiteness, on the one hand, and between conceptual implication and indefiniteness, on the other. We might simply say that factual orientation entails definiteness on the embedded clause whereas conceptual implication entails indefiniteness on both clauses. Now, it is enough to correlate the contrast definite/indefinite with the temporal reference of the two types under discussion to draw the conclusion that the primary placement in the type (9) is definite, and the secondary placement is idnefinite:


It should be observed here that the focal presupposition has a double temporal reference depending on which 'dimension' is under discussion. Strictly, if focal presupposition is 'dominated' by inherent presupposition, it is secondary; if, however, it 'dominates' semantic variables ('vertical' dimension), it becomes primary and defines these variables semantically. As a result, the focal presupposition, contrary to the inherent one, is primary exclusively in type (10):

The above tempral and definite/indefinite conditioning stands for a fundamental classificational principle in a number of English structures. Further, a number of semantic controlling contrasts are strictly correlated with this very

principle. As E. Rando and D. J. Napoli indicate "there are strong connections, and often only subtle distinctions among the members of each of the two contrasting sets: on the one hand, - topic, theme, presupposition, definiteness, anaphoricity, initial position, and old information; on the other, comment, rheme, focus, indefiniteness, non-anaphoricity, final position, and new information" (1978:308). Although they refer this observation to the corpus of there-sentences, we may prove now that the same is characteristic of the corpus under discussion. Let us analyse, first, the surface-structure representations of the sequences:

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There are tigers in India It is likely that he lives in London



b. It is likely

that he lives in London

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-DUMMY
               SUBSTITUTIONAL
+THEME
              +CONCEPT
+TOPIC
              + 'VERTICAL'
DEFINITE
              +CHOICE
              -DEFINITE
              +COMMENT
              +RHEME
              +FOCUS
             [+NON-INITIAL]
              +NON-ANAPHORIC
              +NEW INFORMATION
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The analogy between these two structures being obvious now, let us observe additionally that both of them belong to the type in which the placement of the initial dummy arguments has been triggered by syntax and not meaning (see G. Leech 1974:185). In case of (13a), according to E. Rando and D. J. Napoli (1978:308), "there insertion, viewed functionally, is a transformation designed to provide a dummy theme or topic - definite in form (witness the the in there), in initial position -- in a sentence which would otherwise have none. The comment is moved out of initial position so that it may be more strongly emphasized or focussed upon." (see also Thematization in G. Leech 1974:198). In the second sequence, (13b), 'it' duplicates the real theme "he lives in London" as a result of the application of extraposition transformation, for the same reason.

What the reader should observe now is that though the argument "he lives in London" consists of separate definite items, and though definiteness belongs to the same contrastive set as presupposition does (Rando and Napoli 1978: 308), no presupposition can be placed on it in type (10). This happens because it is not the definiteness of the individual items in the argument (clause) that determines presupposition placement in type (10) but the indefiniteness of the whole fusion of them resulting from a primarily presupposed conceptual implication of the semantic form on the part of the speaker (in the main clause), and of his choice of one of the optional semantic variables. In this way, the definiteness of an isolated embedded clause has been 'indefinitized' and, in a sense, 'neutralized' - which may be confirmed by the neutrality of the 'dummy' initial argument 'it'. In this respect, a potential definiteness of the embedded argument has been blocked, together with its syntactic positional preverbal orientation:

# (14) \*That he lives in London is likely

In this sense, both, there-existential structures and the ones represented here as type (10), are semantically oriented by focal presupposition exclusively and, in fact, belong to the same type.

. As a result of the above argumentation, an important correlation may be inferred, namely, that the argument "that he lives in London" corresponds strictly to Milsark's hypothesis (1974, 1977) referring to there-existential sentences - that in list there-sentences what is predicated as existing is the entire list - so that the quantifiers (a, the) on the individual members are irrelevant, as it is in (Rando and Napoli 1978:301):

- (15) a. A. What's worth visiting here? B: There's the park, a very nice restaurant, and the library. That's all as far as I'm concerned .
- and, in our example:
  - (15) b. It is likely that he lives in London

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The above examples explain why definites are allowed in list-there sentences (15a) and in embedded arguments (15b), and why the whole list in existential sentences, on the one hand, and the whole, embedded argument, on the other, should be classified as indefinite. In existential sentences, the 'newness' is an optional potential CHOICE of variables within a previously determined semantic FORM of these variables within a given list; in the sentences under discussion, the CHOICE is the focal part of the main clause imposing its indefiniteness on the whole embedded clause (argument) regardless of the definite/indefinite contrast in the individual members of this clause, and its factual orientation when in isolation. The above mentioned analogy is sufficient to generalize that the contrast of definiteness/indefiniteness is not a clear-cut and reliable classificational device when referred to the structures under comparison (15a, b). What really counts in this classification is that the speaker, before uttering his message, is left with a double CHOICE. First, he must determine whether his message will start with the reflection of a real world or, conversely, with his conceptual CHOICE of semantic FORM. Once he has chosen the latter alternative, his subsequent step will be the CHOICE of one of the optional SEMANTIC VARIABLES limited by the previously chosen semantic FORM.

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Now one may easily notice that this double CHOICE is strictly correlated with the sequence of TIME and the notion of 'NEWNESS'. This correlation, as the present paper confirms at length, may be best exposed by the contrast anaphoric/non-anaphoric provided that the notion of anaphoricity is used in its broader sense (Kuno 1972). Traditionally, the anaphoric/non-anaphoric contrast is correlated with a 'forward' (anaphoric) or 'backward' (non-anaphoric) linear orientation in a sentence of discourse (though, as in the present paper, it may also operate in a 'downward' and 'upward' dimension). According to Kuno (1972), a given NP (here: argument) is anaphoric when it refers to something known or familiar to both speaker and hearer. What will be anaphoric in this sense in my corups then will be the embedded argument in type (9) which has been based here up to now on the principle of definiteness and inherent presupposition, and which is represented by a considerable number of structures, such as: Definite Names, Cleft Sentences, Tempral Subordinate Clauses, Nonrestrictive Relatives, Aspectuals, Iteratives, Prepositional Quantifiers (E. I. Keenan 1971). If the discourse stimulates the placement of both inherent and focal prasuppositions (as in (9)), the embedded clause will have anaphoric ('forward') reference - reflecting the information shared by the speaker and hearer; then the main clause will be marked kataphorically as revealing 'newness'. At the same time, the said main clause starts working anaphorically in a 'downward' direction when exposing the speaker's choice of semantic FORM, limited to him by the language, the discourse, and the external situation. The type with focal presupposition alone, (10), will, naturally,

take only vertical dimension into account in which the anaphoric ('downward') choice of semantic form will precede the kataphoric choice of semnatic variables ('newness').

Here are the concluding observations resulting from the present paper: a. according to the suggestions of the authors of the paper "Definites in There - sentences", their concept of the superiority of the contrast anaphoric/non-anaphoric over that of definite/non-definite has been supported empirically in this paper when referred to the adjectival predicate constructions,


b. the definite/indefinite contrast does not work as a reliable classifica-

tional instrument in the corups under analysis,

c. a strong inclination is felt by the author of this paper that the contrast anaphoric/non-anaphoric in the sense described in this paper be considered as overlapping the contrast focal/inherent presupposition and, maybe, topic/-/comment, and theme/rheme (see G. Leech 1974:198 - Thematization). Owing to its classificational valours, it might, when formalized as, e.g. ANA-PHORIC CHOICE/NON-ANAPHORIC CHOICE, even eliminate the above competing contrasts,

d. what is to be additionally stressed is the superiority of Jackendoff's interpretation of presupposition ('each sentence must have its presupposition') to the one presented by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971) ,owing to the fact that the former allows much deeper penetration and description of the semantic reality of the structures under discussion,

e. as a surface-structure classificational contrast, the anaphoric/non-anaphoric device may be confirmed as to its reliability by its corresponding deep structure Functional/Thematic Relations (the term used by Jackendoff -1972:29):



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